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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers working with clients under a disability, primarily one involving
mental or psychiatric disorders, have had only a rather amorphous provision to
guide the ethics of their actions. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
Ethical Consideration 7-12 merely "casts additional responsibilities upon" the
lawyer representing the disabled client.' This standard presented the lawyer
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; A.B., 1970, Franklin &
Marshall College; J.D., 1975, Seton Hall University.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1981). This sec-
tion provides:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of
making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibili-
ties upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or
other legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those
decisions which are normally the prerogative of the client to make. If a client
under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in
court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is
capable of understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the ad-
vancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified
1
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with two choices in providing representation: advocate the express desires of
the client, regardless of how those desires were affected by the client's disabled
condition; or determine what he or she believed were the "best interests" of
the client and advocate those interests, regardless of the actual desires of the
client. Thus, the Code merely restated the advocacy/best interests dichotomy
which has traditionally faced lawyers representing mentally-disabled clients.2
from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible
aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel
the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all
circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the
interests of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make
any decision which the law requires his client to perform or make, either act-
ing for himself if competent, or by a duly constituted representative if legally
incompetent.
See also id. EC 7-11 (lawyer's obligations may depend upon "the intelligence, experi-
ence, mental condition or age of a client").
In the context of this Article, unless otherwise indicated, the phrase "disabled cli-
ent" is intended to include only the client disabled by reason of a mental or psychiatric
problem. It is the disabling condition caused by such illness that creates the greatest
difficulty for the lawyer.
2. See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing
Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 46-49
(1974); Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in the Mental Health Field, 1977 AmI. B.
FOUND. R.J. 467, 467; Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 446-57 (1966); Gupta, New York's Mental
Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405,
439-41 (1971); Johnson, Due Process in Involuntary Civil Commitment and Incompe-
tency Adjudication Proceedings: Where Does Colorado Stand?, 46 DEN. L.J. 516, 535-
37, 565-66 (1969); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A
Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1541-42 (1975).
At least part of the dichotomy arises from the failure to determine the legal basis
for commitment of the mentally ill. Under a parens patriae view of commitment, the
relationship between the state and the individual is one of guardianship, protection of
the individual. See Comment, A Constitutional Right to Court Appointed Counsel for
the Involuntarily Committed Mentally Ill: Beyond the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 5
SETON HALL L. REV. 64, 67-68 & nn.13-14 (1973). The power, indeed the right and
obligation of courts of equity to protect both the persofi and property of those unable to
care for themselves, is inherent in those courts and has often been extended to the care
of mentally ill persons and juveniles. See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 956-57 (1959). Thus, proceedings
instituted under a parens patriae concept are not adversarial. See Comment, 5 SETON
HALL L. REV., supra, at 69 & n.18. Because these proceedings are designed to protect
the person involved, there is no conflict between the state and the person who is the
object of the proceedings. See id. at 70.
The other legal justification for commitment is the police power of the state.
Under the police power, commitment is allowed where a person is likely to commit acts
of violence against persons or property. See Ross, supra, at 955-56. In such a circum-
stance, the state is seeking to protect society, rather than the alleged mentally ill per-
son. See Comment, 5 SaTON HALL L. REv., supra, at 74. In exercising its police
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During the 1970's, however, the general trend in the courts favored the
disabled client's right to unfettered advocacy. In Quesnell v. State,3 for exam-
ple, the Washington Supreme Court, in reversing a denial of a motion to va-
cate a civil commitment,4 gave detailed instructions regarding the "additional
responsibilities" placed upon attorneys representing disabled clients. The court
stated that the attorney should be an advocate for the patient, rather than a
non-adversary guardian.5 The attorney must advance for the client all relevant
legal claims or defenses to the proceedings. 6 It is therefore necessary for the
lawyer to fully investigate the facts that are alleged to support the cause
against the client by reviewing appropriate records and interviewing family
and other involved persons.7 The court stated that the client must always be
kept informed of the attorney's actions and the choices available to him.8 The
attorney may not unilaterally waive substantive rights without the client's in-
formed consent.9
Decisions over the past fifteen years have tended to expand the legal
rights of the mentally handicapped and increase the ethical obligations of
counsel. 10 These decisions reveal that the dichotomous standard in the Code
3. 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1974) (en banc).
4. Id. at 244, 517 P.2d at 580. Quesnell was ordered committed to a psychiat-
ric hospital following a hearing, in which she was represented by privately retained
counsel and a court-appointed attorney denominated a guardian ad litem. Although
Quesnell and her private counsel requested a jury trial on the issue of commitment, the
attorney-guardian waived the right. At the commitment hearing, the court ruled that a
jury trial had been waived by Quesnell through the attorney-guardian ad litem. A mo-
tion to vacate the consequent order of commitment was denied and the appeal followed.
Although the appeal was taken to determine the issue of the authority of the attorney-
guardian ad litem to waive jury trial, the court chose to discuss all due process aspects
of the case. Id. at 226-27, 517 P.2d at 570-71.
5. Id. at 234, 517 P.2d at 574-76. The court noted that much of the difficulty
resulted from a "lack of judicially enunciated, appropriate standards or guidelines de-
fining the role of the guardian ad litem and the scope of his authority." Id. at 235, 517
P.2d at 575. The court pointed out the difficulties for the lawyer representing the dis-
abled client under the current code: "The lawyer representing a prospective patient in a
typical civil commitment proceeding is a stranger in a strange land without benefit of
guidebook, map, or dictionary." Id. at 235 n.15, 517 P.2d at 575 n.15 (quoting Cohen,
supra note 2, at 424).
6. 83 Wash. 2d at 236, 517 P.2d at 576.
7. Id. at 237-38, 517 P.2d at 576-77.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. In 1967, the Supreme Court indicated that due process was necessary
before a juvenile could be deprived of liberty in a juvenile proceeding. In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967). Because juvenile proceedings and commitment proceedings have been
viewed together under the parens patriae theory, see note 2 supra, it was only logical
to extend the rationale of Gault, implicitly making the juvenile proceeding adversarial,
to the commitment proceeding. In 1968, the Tenth Circuit linked the parens patriae
power to the police power after recognizing that Gault would apply to commitments:
Where, as in both proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons,
the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to
1984]
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has become an incorrect statement of the law.
In August, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct."1 Model Rule 1.14 is the first explicit ethical guide
for the lawyer faced with the difficult task of representing the disabled client.' 2
This Article explores the provisions of this new Rule to determine if guidance
is really provided to the lawyer.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODEL RULE 1.14
The Model Rules arose from the appointment, in 1977, of the American
Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, popu-
larly known as the Kutak Commission. The initial draft of Model Rule 1.14
proposed by the Commission provided:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority,
mental disability, or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reason-
ably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer shall secure the appointment of a guardian or other legal
representative, or seek a protective order with respect to a client, only when
the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately communicate
or exercise judgment in the client-lawyer relationship.1
discharge due process and this necessarily includes the duty to see that a sub-
ject of an involuntary commitment proceedings is afforded the opportunity to
the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings ...
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968), cited in Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (due process mandates "that a person de-
tained on grounds of mental illness has a right to counsel").
The parens patriae theory of commitment was dealt a death blow in 1975, when
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required that any commitment be pos-
ited on dangerousness to society. O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
Such confinement "is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish with-
out due process of law." Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring). By moving to a standard
requiring danger, the Court permitted the police power protection of society while re-
jecting the parens patriae notion of protective guardianship.
Further decisions make clear the limitations on that permitted police power. For a
state to confine an allegedly mentally ill person, the state must justify that deprivation
of liberty clearly and convincingly. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
Likewise, where parents or the state seek the "voluntary" commitment of a child, due
process will require some degree of objective fact finding to sanction the parent or
state's determination to seek commitment and regular reviews of such a decision. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979).
11. Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 52 U.S.L.W. 2077, 2077
(Aug. 29, 1983). A full reprint of the Model Rules is contained in Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 52 U.S.L.W. 3 (August 16, 1983).
12. An earlier draft of Model Rule 1.14 indicated that it had no counterpart in
the current disciplinary rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14
code comparison (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (Discussion Draft
1980).
4
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Unlike the Discussion Draft, the Proposed Final Draft was accompanied by
legal background. The legal comments to Rule 1.14 outlined the conflicting
literature regarding the lawyer's duty to the disabled client.14 In addition, the
alterations suggested in the Proposed Final Draft also lessened the obligation
of the lawyer to seek protection for the client from "when doing so is necessary
in the client's best interest," 5 to "only when the lawyer reasonably believes
that the client cannot adequately communicate or exercise judgment in the
client-lawyer relationship."" The Proposed Final Draft and its comments,
however, indicated that the "lawyer's relationship with a disabled client ordi-
narily should not differ from the normal client-lawyer relationship."' 7
Further comments were solicited following publication of the Proposed
Final Draft. As a result, a Revised Final Draft, dated June 30, 1982, was
published prior to the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association
House of Delegates."8 The Revised Final Draft was partially considered by the
House of Delegates at the 1982 annual meeting. Action on the full body of the
rules, including Model Rule 1.14, was deferred, however, until the February
1983 meeting.18 At the February meeting, all final amendments to the rules
were considered and the Final Draft of the Rules was formulated. 20 The Final
Draft was approved by the House of Delegates at the annual meeting in Au-
gust 1983." a Model Rule 1.14 remained unchanged from the Revised Final
Draft in June 1982 through final adoption of the Rules in August 1983. This
final revision of the Rule is the subject of this Article.
Model Rule 1.14(a) provides: "When a client's ability to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether
because of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relation-
ship with the client."' 2 This rule makes the traditional obligations and ethical
responsibilities of an attorney applicable to the client with a disability. When
read in conjunction with other rules,2 3 the duties envisioned by Rule 1.14(a)
14. Id. legal background (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
15. Id. Rule 1.14 (Discussion 1980).
16. Id. Rule 1.14 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
17. Id. comment.
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft with Re-
visions through June 30, 1982) (Red Line Draft).
19. See Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, 51 U.S.L.W. 2488,
2488 (Feb. 22, 1983).
20. Id.
21. See note 12 supra.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.14(a) (ABA Adopted
Version 1983).
23. "The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be
interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope (ABA Adopted Version 1983). The
1981 Proposed Final Draft made it even clearer that the rules were to be interpreted in
pari materia: "Taken together, the Rules provide elements of the lawyer's professional
role." Id. (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The elimination of this sentence from the
1984]
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are virtually identical to the role of the lawyer as viewed by decisions like
Quesnell.
In representing a disabled client, a lawyer must abide by the client's deci-
sions and should not be influenced by the advice or payment of the legal fee by
another.24 As a result, the lawyer represents only the interests of the person
with the disability and consequently advocates only that person's interests.
Those interests can be fully advanced so long as they appear lawful.25 The
duty to investigate, as seen in Quesnell, is covered by Model Rules 1.126 and
1.3,2' 7 dealing with competence and diligence. The rules also require communi-
cation with a client.28 Finally, Model Rule 1.2 requires that the client control
the substantive aspects of any litigation.29
Rule 1.14(a) fits neatly into the philosophy of Chairman Robert Kutak,
whose Introduction to the Proposed Final Draft indicates an attempt by the
drafters of the Model Rules to restate attorney-client law."0 It nicely summa-
rizes current attitudes toward the representation of the disabled client and
should be a welcome addition.
Because Rule 1.14(a) is so precise in summarizing the current law, the
apparent inconsistency of Rule 1.14(b) is evident on initial reading. As
adopted, Rule 1.14(b) provides: "A lawyer may seek the appointment of a
guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client, only when the
lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's
own interest."31 It thus appears that Rule 1.14(b) takes away what Rule
1.14(a) has given. On one hand, a normal attorney-client relationship is re-
Adopted Version cannot be considered an abandonment of the requirement that the
rules should be read together.
24. See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (ABA
Adopted Version). The payment of a lawyer's fee by another is permissible, so long as
payment does not compromise the loyalty of the lawyer to the client. Id. comment; see
also id. Rule 1.8(0(1) (ABA Adopted Version, 1983) ("A lawyer shall not accept
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless . . . the
client consents after consultation.").
25. See id. Rules 3.1, 3.3 (ABA Adopted Version 1983). Rule 3.1 deals with
meritorious claims and provides that a lawyer should not bring, defend, or assert ,a
frivolous issue or claim. Rule 3.3 concerns the lawyer's duties of candor to a tribunal.
26. See id. Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
27. See id. Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and prompt-
ness in representing a client.").
28. The lawyer must "keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information" and "explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci-
sions regarding the representation." Id. Rule 1.4.
29. See id. Rule 1.2. If the lawyer in Quesnell had followed the obligations set
out in notes 24-28 supra, he would have fulfilled the duties imposed by the court.
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT chairman's introduction
(Proposed Final Draft 1981).
31. Id. Rule 1.14(b) (ABA Adopted Version 1983).
498 [Vol. 49
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quired when the client is disabled. On the other hand, the lawyer can also take
actions that the lawyer believes are in the client's interest. As noted in the
comment to the rule, "[t]he lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably
difficult one." 32
The general thrust of Model Rule 1.14 apparently remained the same
throughout the history of its drafting. Nevertheless, there is a significant
change in the adopted version of Model Rule 1.14(b), which did not exist in
either the Discussion Draft or the Proposed Final Draft. In the adopted ver-
sion, the lawyer no longer is obligated to seek the appointment of a guardian
or to take protective action on behalf of a client. Instead, the duty becomes
one of permission---"[a] lawyer may seek the appointment." By using "may,"
the drafters changed the obligations of the lawyer. When "shall" is used in the
Model Rules, as it was in the initial two versions of Model Rule 1.14(b), it
means that a violation of the rule subjects the lawyer to discipline. When
"may" is used in the adopted version, the lawyer must exercise professional
discretion. "No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses
not to act. . . within the bounds of such discretion."3 3 It initially appears that
the provision of Model Rule 1.14(b) advises the lawyer of the possible availa-
ble choices when the client is unable to exercise judgment in the client-lawyer
relationship. The fallacy of that logic rests not in the provisions of the rule
itself, but rather in the mechanics of the rule.
The decision by a lawyer to secure a representative or take other protec-
tive action for the disabled client, even where such action is permissive, will
almost always require a revelation of so much of the client's condition as
caused the lawyer to believe that the client could not effectively act in the
client's own interest. If litigation is pending, the lawyer seeking the relief per-
mitted by the rule would probably ask the court to determine the mental sta-
tus of the client. This would be done by a request for a mental examination.34
Examination is allowed only "upon good cause," which should require the law-
yer to advise the court of the underlying factual basis for suspecting that the
client is unfit.35
If no action is pending involving the client, the lawyer must ask for a
guardian to be appointed through a guardianship proceeding alleging incompe-
tence. In such a proceeding, the lawyer will have to reveal the client's condi-
tion to a person qualified to be the representative, and then to the court. The
court will determine the competence of the client after appointing another
lawyer to represent the client in the competency hearing. 36 The decision to
32. Id. Rule 1.14 comment.
33. Id. scope.
34. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
35. At issue in such orders is the "sanctity of the person, by virtue of which
personal examinations were at one time regarded as abhorrent. . . . [T]he motion is
not a mere formality but requires individualized exercise of the court's discretion." F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.6, at 189 (2d ed. 1977).
36. A proceeding to have a person declared incompetent is usually adversarial.
1984]
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seek protection for the client requires the lawyer to collect, synthesize, evalu-
ate, and then reveal information communicated to the lawyer by the disabled
client in the context of the relationship. Therefore, a lawyer must consider the
provisions of Model Rule 1.6, which forbid unconsented revelation of "infor-
mation relating to representation of a client," unless revelation is sanctioned
by the rule.37 Model Rule 1.6 is mandatory, so a violation can result in disci-
pline.38 Thus, when a lawyer chooses to exercise professional discretion under
the "may" standard of Rule 1.14, he can easily run afoul of the "shall" stan-
dard of Rule 1.6. Under the confidence provisions of Rule 1.6, disclosure of
information is permitted when disclosure is: (1) impliedly authorized; (2) nec-
essary to prevent the client's commission of a criminal act likely to result in
death or serious bodily harm; or (3) necessary to protect the interest of the
lawyer in a proceeding brought by the client, to defend the lawyer against a
claim based on the conduct of the client, or to respond in any type of action
dealing with the lawyer's representation of the client.39 Because the third ex-
ception is inapplicable here, the focus must be on the first two exceptions,
together with any additional exceptions which might be applicable.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY EXCEPTIONS
A. Rule 1.6(a)-Revelation Impliedly Authorized
Initially, it might seem that revelation of the client's disability is always
impliedly authorized; disclosure would enable the lawyer to fully carry out
what the lawyer believes to be the purpose of the representation. Assuming
See, e.g., Wise v. Berman, 282 F. Supp. 282, 284 (M.D. Fla. 1967). Accordingly, stat-
utory schemes often require the appointment of counsel for the alleged incompetent.
See, e.g., ILL. ANr. STAT. ch. 110, § ila-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 475.075 (1978). Some statutes refer to the appointed attorney as a guardian
ad litem. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-5-303 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303
(1978).
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (ABA Adopted
Version 1983):
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
38. See id. scope.
39. See id. Rule 1.6.
[Vol. 49
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that the client does not wish the revelation made, such a reading is impermis-
sible.40 The comments to Model Rule 1.6(a) make it clear that the rule is not
intended to substitute the lawyer's judgment for the client's. This rule is
designed instead to be a substitute for DR 4-101, which authorizes disclosure
upon the client's consent. 1 Since consent to take certain procedural actions on
the client's behalf may be implied,42 the real meaning of this exception is to
permit the lawyer to negotiate for the client, by revealing information con-
veyed to the lawyer, on the theory that such disclosure will advance the lawful
objectives of the client.43 The exception thus works in harmony with Model
Rule 1.2(a), which obligates the lawyer to abide by the client's decisions con-
cerning the subject matter of the representation."
The exception in Model Rule 1.6(a) would not authorize disclosure of the
client's condition, a disclosure almost certain to adversely affect the client's
40. Currently, a lawyer is authorized to reveal confidences "with the consent of
the client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(1) (1981).
The exception to confidentiality currently contained in Model Rule 1.6(a), permitting
disclosure of "impliedly authorized" information, was a specific exception in earlier
versions of the Model Rules. Under the Proposed Final Draft, a lawyer was permitted
to reveal information "to serve the client's interest, unless it is information the client
has specifically requested not be disclosed." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Under these earlier drafts, a conflict with
Model Rule 1.14 is even more pronounced. It was permissible, under Model Rule 1.6,
to reveal information when revelation was in the interests of the client, and such revela-
tion was apparently compelled under Model Rule 1.14(b) "when the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client cannot adequately communicate or exercise judgment in the
client-lawyer relationship." Id. Rule 1.14(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Thus, it
could have been argued that the "interests" standard of Rule 1.6 was met when the
"best interests" standard of Rule 1.14(b) was satisfied. The legal background to the
same draft, however, indicated that the Model Rules were adopting the "advocacy"
rather than "best interests" approach to representing the mentally ill. See id. legal
background; compare note 2 supra.
Under the early written drafts, the comments to Rule 1.6 also indicated that the
"interest" standard of that rule applied only to disclosures necessary to the "proper
representation of the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The same commentary appears in the adopted
version. Id. Rule 1.6 comment (ABA Adopted Version 1983). Thus, even under the
adopted version, it appears that there has been no reference between Model Rules 1.6
and 1.14 on this issue.
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 code comparison
(Proposed Final Draft 1981). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(C)(1) (1981) provides that revelation may be made of "[c]onfidences or secrets
with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to
them."
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (ABA
Adopted Version 1983).
43. "[A] client impliedly consents to disclosures ordinarily necessary to effect the
purposes of representation." Id. Rule 1.6 legal background (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
44. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (ABA
Adopted Version 1983).
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interest.45 Implied authority to reveal applies to procedural revelation in fur-
therance of the client's objectives.46 It cannot authorize the revelation contem-
plated by Rule 1.14(b).
B. Rule 1.6(b)(1)-Revelation to Prevent the Commission of a Crime
The longstanding exception in Rule 1.6(b)(1) may permit some revelation
by the lawyer representing a disabled client.47 It would be a serious mistake,
however, to allow this exception to sanction all of the revelation permitted by
Rule 1.14(b). If a client, because of mental deficiencies, advises the lawyer of
an intent to commit an act substantially likely to seriously injure or kill a
45. Id. Rule 1.14 comment.
46. Any implied authority is somewhat limited by the lawyer's obligation both to
keep the client informed about the status of any matters and to fully explain matters to
enable the client to make informed decisions. See id. Rule 1.4 (ABA Adopted Version
1983).
47. Under current DR 4-101(C)(2), a lawyer is permitted to reveal confidential
information received from a client when revelation is permitted by disciplinary rule or
required by law. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2)
(1981). Under id. DR 7-102(B)(1), a lawyer is permitted by the disciplinary rules to
reveal a fraud perpetrated by a client upon a person or tribunal. In 1974, the current
DR 7-102 was amended to permit the foregoing revelation, except when such revelation
would be prevented because the information given to the lawyer was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. See id. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). As of 1980, however, only about 29 states had
adopted the amendment to this rule. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
STATE DR 7-102 (1980).
The exception created in Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) grew from the common law excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege that exempted aid or advice in furtherance of a
crime or fraud. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2298 (J.
McNaughton rev. 1961); see also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVI-
DENCE § 95 & n.48 (2d ed. J. Cleary 1972); E. WEEKS, ATTORNEYS AND COUNSEL-
LORS AT LAW § 166 (2d ed. 1892). Through the multiple drafts of the Model Rules,
this exception was extensively debated. In the original discussion draft, the attorney
was permitted to disclose confidential information when "necessary to prevent or rectify
the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act by the client." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c)(2) (Discussion Draft 1980). By the Proposed Final
Draft, however, that exception was changed to permit the lawyer to reveal only when
the lawyer's services had been used in the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act
by the client. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). This position was soft-
ened by the "red line" draft to change the rule from use of the lawyer's services in the
commission of such an act, to use of the lawyer's services in "furtherance" of a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Revised Final Draft 1982). The exception
was eliminated entirely. Midyear Meeting of American Bar Association, 51 U.S.L.W.
2488, 2488-89 (Feb. 22, 1983). Under the rules adopted, it appears that ethical "confi-
dentiality" under Model Rule 1.6 and evidentiary attorney-client privilege are treated
somewhat differently, with the latter being defined by state evidence law. Whether spe-
cific attorney-client privilege rules will displace the provisions of Model Rule 1.6 is left
to substantive law, although a presumption will exist against the revelation of confiden-
tial information. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment
(ABA Adopted Version 1983).
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person,48 revelation is permitted to the extent necessary to prevent the act.49 If
the lawyer is convinced that such a decision is the product of a defect, the
client's ability to make judgments arguably is impaired enough to satisfy the
reasonable belief standard of Rule 1.14(b). Such an assumption would be in
error.
When the two rules are read together, the lawyer apparently has permis-
sion to reveal information about a disabled client to prevent that disabled cli-
ent from committing an act of substantial bodily harm, as announced by the
client, or to secure a personal representative or seek protective action against
the client. This reading is a mixture of two distinct mental health stan-
dards-commitment and incompetence. One can be committed to a psychiat-
ric facility when the individual poses a strong likelihood of committing "signif-
icant physical or psychological injury to persons." 50 Thus, if a client meets this
legal standard of commitment, then the standard for revelation within the ex-
ception of Rule 1.6(b)(2) is satisfied.
If the disabled client meets the commitment standard, revelation is neces-
sary only to prevent the imminent bodily harm expressed in Rule 1.6. Satisfy-
ing a commitment standard does not automatically sanction revelation of the
totality of the client's mental condition. For a person to be declared incompe-
tent and require a personal representative, there must be a determination that
the person "is unable to care for himself or for his property."51 This standard
is akin to Model Rule 1.14(b), but distinct from the commitment-like standard
of Model Rule 1.6. In fact, the two standards are totally separate. In Missouri,
for example, no committed person "shall be presumed to be incompetent, to
forfeit any legal right, responsibility or obligation or to suffer any legal disabil-
ity as a citizen," as a result of the commitment.52 In New Jersey, persons
committed to a state facility for the mentally retarded do not, by virtue of that
fact, lose their right to vote. 3 By itself, commitment does not authorize a
court to appoint a guardian without a full competency proceeding. 54 Thus, the
exception permitting the revelation of a client's intent to commit a crime does
not necessarily constitute permission to reveal the information that would be
disclosed under Rule 1.14(b). 55 Otherwise, the provisions of Rule 1.14(b)
48. At least one decision has indicated that the intent of the client to do injury
must be established for the lawyer beyond a reasonable doubt before revelation is re-
quired. See Hawkins v. King County, 24 Wash. App. 338, 345, 602 P.2d 361, 365
(1979).
49. See id. (intent need be communicated only to the person who is the object
of the client's intent).
50. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 259, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (1975).
51. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West 1981) (conservators).
52. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.120 (Supp. 1983).
53. See Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 439, 448, 354 A.2d 355, 359 (App.
Div. 1976).
54. See, e.g., In re B., 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760 (Law Div. 1977).
55. The foregoing analysis focuses on the difference between a commitment
standard and a competence standard. In dealing with revelation under the final version
1984]
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would directly conflict with Rule 1.14(a).
If a lawyer represents a person who has been committed at a commitment
review hearing, Rule 1.14(a) obligates the lawyer to be an advocate for the
client. At some point during that proceeding, even after following the guide-
lines set out in Quesnell,5 6 the lawyer may develop a reasonable belief that the
client is dangerous within the "commitment" definition. If that reasonable be-
lief triggers the duties of Rule 1.14(b), the lawyer's duty as an advocate
within the meaning of Rule 1.14(a) might cease in favor of permission to take
protective action for the client, thus perpetuating the commitment. Conse-
quently, the lawyer is acting "not as an advocate for the [client,] but as a
traditional guardian whose function is to evaluate for himself what is in the
best interests of his client-ward and proceed, almost independent of the will of
the client-ward, to accomplish this. '5 7 Such representation by non-adversary
counsel is not only unconstitutional in the commitment setting,5 8 but appar-
ently violates Rule 1.2's command that the lawyer abide by the client's
decisions.
Thus, while the exception contained in Rule 1.6(b)(1) may be useful to
the lawyer representing a disabled client, it does not permit general revelation
of the client's condition. The rule exists only to compel the lawyer to reveal the
information necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminally injur-
ing act.
C. Disclosures Required by Law
As stated in the comments to the adopted version of Model Rule 1.6, the
Model Rules "in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose
information relating to the representation. . . . In addition to these provisions,
of Model Rule 1.6, however, it is possible to add a third standard of review to mental
health cases, the criminal standard. Under the traditional M'Naghten definition of cul-
pability, there can be no finding of criminal guilt if "the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong." Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,
722 (H.L. 1843).
Under the adopted version of Model Rule 1.6, a lawyer is permitted to reveal
confidential information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (ABA Adopted Version
1983). If the lawyer is convinced that the client meets the M'Naghten test, and, there-
fore, the acts of the client would not result in criminal culpability, is the permission
given to the lawyer to reveal necessarily eliminated? Certainly the rules of ethics
should not be so narrowly interpreted.
56. 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973); see notes 5-10 and accompanying
text supra.
57. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (quoting
Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a Reexamination,
51 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 33 (1967)).
58. 349 F. Supp. at 1099.
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a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give
information about a client." 59 The comments to the rules are intended as inter-
pretive guides.60 In earlier drafts of the Model Rules, this "other law" excep-
tion was part of the rule itself.6 1 The exception was eliminated from the
adopted version.6 2 A similar exception exists under DR 4-101(C)(2), which
allows an attorney to reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under
Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order,"63 and the adopted ver-
sion of the Model Rules apparently includes this exception." Thus, the
adopted rules cannot be said to be substantially different from the current
disciplinary rules.6 5  DR 4-101(C)(2) was drafted to fill an evident gap in
Original Canon 37.66 Under that canon, it was clear that a lawyer should not
reveal the confidence of a client who admitted to the lawyer commission of a
past crime, 7 and equally clear that the client's announced intent to commit a
future crime had to be revealed. In 1936, however, the American Bar Associa-
tion was asked about a situation that fit neither category. 8 A client admitted
to a past crime, jumped bail and fled, but he kept his attorney informed of his
whereabouts. The question was whether these actions were a past crime, a
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 comment (ABA
Adopted Version 1983).
60. Id. scope.
61. In the discussion draft, the exception permitted revelation "[a]s otherwise
permitted by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. Rule 1.7(b)(4) (Discussion
Draft 1980). In the proposed final draft, the exception permitted revelation "[t]o com-
ply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law." Id. Rule 1.6(b)(5) (Proposed
Final Draft 1981). In the Revised Final Draft, the exception permitted revelation "[t]o
comply with other law." Id. Rule 1.6(b)(4) (Revised Final Draft 1982).
62. See id. Rule 1.6 comment (ABA Adopted Version 1983).
63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1981).
64. "The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal
of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6 comment (ABA Adopted Version
1983).
65. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.6 code comparison (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
66. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs Canon 37 (Canons withdrawn
1969):
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing
the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to
respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to pre-
vent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.
67. Compare MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7(c)(2) (Dis-
cussion Draft 1980) (preventing revelation of a past act when the lawyer had been
employed by the client after commission of the act by the client) with id. Rule
1.6(b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (permitting revelation of past conduct when the
lawyer's services had been used only in furtherance of the past act) and id. Rule 1.6
(ABA Adopted Version 1983) (makes no reference to such revelation and therefore
renders any revelation impermissible under the general ban in Rule 1.6(a)).
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future crime, or both, and more importantly, whether they should be revealed
by the attorney. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances re-
sponded that the client, by jumping bail, was guilty of the separate offense of
escape, and if the lawyer failed to reveal the whereabouts of the client, the
lawyer was guilty of aiding the escape.69 The opinion stated that the lawyer's
duty to society compelled revelation of the whereabouts of the client.70
The purpose of this confidentiality exception is clearer in dealing with
physical evidence. When a client admits to the lawyer that he has committed
an armed robbery and then gives the lawyer the weapon and the money, the
lawyer is protected from revealing the client's commission of the robbery. The
lawyer hiding the weapon and the money, however, has committed a crime.71
"A person commits the crime of tampering with physical evidence if he...
conceals any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its . . . availa-
bility in any official proceeding or investigation."7 2 When such a statute is
coupled with DR 7-102(A)(3), which prevents a lawyer from concealing that
which by law is required to be revealed, the revelation of the weapon and the
money may be required.7 1
There are issues relating to revelation under DR 4-101(C)(2) that seem
to fall into areas not quite covered by the crime or fraud exception.7 4 DR 7-
102(A)(3), (B) 75 is the section most often associated with this rule.7 6 The
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va.), affd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th
Cir. 1967); see also In re January, 1976, Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir.
1976) (money received by lawyer from robbery suspects must be turned over); Morrell
v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Alaska 1978) (legal pad containing kidnapping plan
written by defendant given to defense attorney by third party); People v. Lee, 3 Cal.
App. 3d 514, 524, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 721 (1970) (blood-stained shoes given to defense
counsel by defendant's wife); State ex rel. Sowers v. Qlwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 831, 394
P.2d 681, 683 (1964) (knife given by defendant to counsel).
In People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981), a
defendant admitted to his counsel that he had stolen the victim's wallet, divided the
money with a codefendant, and attempted to burn the wallet in a trash can. Id. at 686,
631 P.2d at 48, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 614. Defense counsel had his investigator remove the
wallet so counsel could examine it, thereafter turning it over to police. At trial, this
investigator was asked by the prosecution to reveal where the investigator had observed
the wallet. In resolving the issue of whether the observation of the wallet was protected
by the attorney-client privilege, the court held that if an attorney observes evidence in
its original location, having learned of that location from the client, and leaves the
evidence in that location, then the observation is privileged. If, however, the evidence is
removed, its effect is to destroy the evidence and the observation is no longer protected.
Id. at 694-95, 631 P.2d at 53-54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.100 (1978).
73. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment
(ABA Adopted Version 1983).
74. See note 47 supra.
75. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3)(1981) (a "lawyer shall not conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is re-
quired by law to reveal"). Id. DR 7-102(B) provides:
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Kutak drafters appear to carry this philosophy forward by indicating that
rules requiring revelation under this exception include Rule 3.3, dealing with
candor toward a tribunal,7 7 and Rule 4.1, dealing with truthfulness in transac-
tions with third parties.7 It appears that the law requires a lawyer to reveal
confidential information only when necessary to prevent ongoing fraud or
crimes not covered by existing exceptions.79 Such was the intent of the current
disciplinary rules, and there is no evidence of an intent to expand the Model
Rules to include revelation of a client's illness as envisioned by Rule 1.14(b).
Under the Model Rules, disclosure under Rule 1.6 "is a matter of interpreta-
tion beyond the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should exist against
such a [disclosure]. '""O
D. The Result
In referring to rules that could require a lawyer to reveal confidential
information under the provisions of Model Rule 1.6, the drafters of the Kutak
rules specifically mentioned: Rule 2.2 (intermediaries); Rule 2.3 (evaluations
for third parties); Rule 3.3 (candor toward a tribunal); and Rule 4.1 (truthful-
ness toward others).81- The authors have failed to read Rule 1.14(b) in the
context of Rule 1.6. Thus, while comments to Rule 1.14 recognize that the
decision to disclose the disability could be adverse to the client,8 2 they make no
reference to the general ban of Rule 1.6 on the use of such information relat-
ing to the representation. This is so even though the early drafts of Rule 1.6
make it clear that the information covered under the confidentiality provisions
is broader than that currently covered in DR 4-101." s
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal except when the information is protected as
a privileged communication.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal
shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
76. See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2),
at 176 (Am. B. Found. 1979).
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.3 (ABA Adopted
Version 1983).
78. Id. Rule 4.1.
79. See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2),
at 176 (Am. B. Found. 1979).




83. See id. Rule 1.6 code comparison (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Except as
permitted in the exceptions, the "lawyer shall not reveal information relating to repre-
sentation of a client." Id. Rule 1.6(a). "The principle of confidentiality is enlarged. ..
to all information about a client 'relating to the representation.'" See id. comment.
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Two comments to 1.14(b) reflect that Rule 1.14 was not analyzed in the
context of Rule 1.6 before being proposed. The first comment states: "If a
legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer
should look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. If a legal
representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should see to such an ap-
pointment where it would serve the client's best interests. ''84 In the second
comment, the lawyer is advised, before making disclosure, to "consult an ap-
propriate diagnostician for guidance. '85 Neither comment advises the lawyer
that cooperating with a legal representative, seeking the appointment of such a
representative, or consulting a diagnostician will require revelation of the in-
formation protected from disclosure by Model Rule 1.6. The drafters have
equated a decision by the lawyer under Rule 1.14(b) to seek the "best inter-
ests" for the client with actions impliedly authorized by Rule 1.6(a) in fur-
therance of the representation. The lawyer does not, however, have the tacit
permission to reveal the condition of the client so as to have the individual
liberty of the client restricted by the imposition of a guardian or a protective
order. Such action by the lawyer would not just violate the client's confidence;
it would also place the lawyer and client in an adversary posture, an impermis-
sible conflict of interest.
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Model Rule 1.7(b) forbids a lawyer from representing a client "if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's respon-
sibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own inter-
ests." 86 Under Rule 1.14(b), once a lawyer decides that the client is unable to
make adequate decisions concerning the subject matter of the representation,
the lawyer may choose to seek a representative or protective order for that
client. As noted by the comment, "raising the question of disability could, in
some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment." 87 Rec-
ognizing that appointing a representative or seeking a protective order could
seriously affect the client's liberty, it must be equally apparent that the lawyer
who invokes the provisions of the rule has developed interests adverse to the
client's. Accordingly, once a lawyer makes the decision under Rule 1.14(b) to
seek a guardian or protective order, the relationship with the client must ter-
minate,88 except in the rare instance where the client consents.
Even if the relationship terminates, however, the lawyer cannot follow the
rule. Although the attorney-client relationship has terminated, the lawyer's ob-
84. Id. Rule 1.14 comment.
85. Id.
86. Id. Rule 1.7(b).
87. Id. Rule 1.14 comment.
88. Once the personal or other professional interest of the lawyer adversely im-
pacts on the representation of the client, the lawyer must decline the representation.
See id. Rule 1.7(b).
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ligation of confidentiality remains, preventing disclosure of the client's condi-
tion.8 By seeking a guardian or a protective order, the lawyer would be in
plain violation of Rule 1.9.190 Having represented the disabled client, the law-
yer is prevented from using the information gained in that representation
against the client. Nor may the lawyer represent someone qualified to seek a
declaration of incompetency against the client, because the competency pro-
ceeding would be a substantially related transaction.9
Although Rule 1.7 permits a non-prohibitive conflict where the lawyer
can determine that the best interests of the client can be served, these are not
the kind of best interests that is often referred to in dealing with disabled
persons. As stated in the comment to Rule 1.7: "[W]hen a disinterested law-
yer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under
the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement
or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. 19 2 In determining
whether the lawyer should reveal the disabling condition of the client over the
client's liberty interests, no neutral lawyer could agree that such action meets
this standard.
There are no exceptions to the general confidence rule that permit the
disclosure apparently intended by Rule 1.14(b). Even if exceptions existed,
conflict-of-interest considerations forbid the actions contemplated by the rule.
It thus becomes important to determine the impact of eliminating Rule
1.14(b) upon the philosophy expressed in the remainder of the rules.
V. ELIMINATING MODEL RULE 1.14(b)
In adopting Model Rule 1.14(a), a decision was made to provide all cli-
ents with representation, regardless of their mental state. "The fact that a
client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the
client with attention and respect. 19 3 Having determined that the lawyer's role
89. Id. Rule 1.6 comment (ABA Adopted Version 1983).
90. See id. Rule 1.9:
A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interest is materially adverse to the interest of the former
client unless the former client consents after disclosure; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when
the information has become generally known.
91. The substantial relationship test has its genesis in T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): "[T]he former client
need show no more than that the matters embraced within the pending suit wherein his
former attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substantially related to the mat-
ters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former
client."
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 comment (ABA
Adopted Version 1983).
93. Id. Rule 1.14 comment.
19841
17
Devine: Devine: Ethics of Representing the Disabled Client:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
is primarily one of representative advocacy, it must be recognized that there
will be clients who will make wrong decisions, whether due to age, education,
or mental incapacity. If the lawyer is to be an advocate, clients must be per-
mitted to make bad choices. The obligation of the lawyer is not to force an
adversary position with the client, but to work with the client in an attorney-
client relationship. The lawyer should counsel the client and help the client
make decisions based on appropriate information. Only then does the lawyer
fulfill all of the obligations imposed under Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
This is not to say that the lawyer should never reveal information about a
disabled client learned during the course of the representation. The instances,
however, in which such revelation should be permitted are the same as those
for which revelation is permitted with a traditional client. Two examples prove
useful. First, if a client is underage or declared incompetent, the law requires
the appointment of a guardian ad litem.9' Permitting the client to proceed
without such appointment violates civil procedure provisions, and would thus
be outside the provisions of the Model Rules.95
Second, if a client, because of mental illness, indicates to the lawyer an
intent to injure someone, Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits a limited amount of revela-
tion. While earlier drafts of this rule seemed to require that revelation could
be made only when the intent appeared to injure a third party,96 the adopted
version permits revelation whenever it appears that the acts of the client are
likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm" to anyone,
including the client.97 Since suicide is a crime at common law, 8 a lawyer
would therefore be required to reveal a client's contemplated suicide. Elimina-
tion of Rule 1.14(b) would also force a lawyer representing a disabled client to
take actions short of revelation in certain circumstances. Again, such actions
would be consistent with similar representation of non-disabled clients. For
example, if a lawyer is appointed to represent a committed client, Rules
1.14(a) and 1.14(b) could indeed conflict with the lawyer's constitutional obli-
gations to provide representative advocacy. 99 If Rule 1.14(b) is eliminated, the
lawyer's representation may be limited in scope by Rule 1.2(c) to advocating
the desires of the client, regardless of the determination by the lawyer of the
client's apparent mental state.100 "The objectives or scope of services provided
by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms
94. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
95. The lawyer must disclose information when required by court order. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (ABA Adopted Version 1983).
96. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Revised Final Draft 1982) (permitting revela-
tion only when the intent to injure was directed at the property interests of another).
97. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (ABA Adopted Version 1983).
98. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 82-83 (2d ed. 1969). The ABA has agreed
that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer to reveal the in-
tent of a client to commit suicide. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1500 (1983).
99. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
100. See Rule 1.2(c).
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under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client."10' In the
commitment hearing, the lawyer is obligated to advocate the client's desires,
and the client usually desires not to remain committed. 02 The appointment of
a lawyer in such a situation is intended as a limited appointment and should
be treated as such. Without the conflict created by granting permission to re-
veal information under Rule 1.14(b), that limited scope can be fully realized.
Civilly committed clients also have problems in more traditional civil law
areas. 10 3 Because commitment does not automatically render a client incompe-
tent, 0 4 eliminating Rule 1.14(b) would permit the lawyer to render loyal ser-
vice to the disabled client without revealing the client's condition. Such repre-
sentation would not be unchecked. If illness was influencing the client to file
lawsuits that were frivolous or worthless or designed only to harass or embar-
rass another person, revelation would not be the answer because the lawyer is
already precluded from such actions by virtue of other rules.' 05
Occasionally, because of some underlying disability, the assistance sought
by the client will result in financial catastrophe for the client. Revelation does
not solve this problem. Such cases usually arise by unwise judgment on the
part of the client or by someone else attempting to defraud the unsuspecting
client. The duties of the lawyer in such circumstances are both correlative and
corresponding.10 6 Correlative duties of the lawyer include the duties of compe-
tence, communication, and the absence of conflicts of interest. 0 7 These obliga-
tions flow directly from the lawyer/client relationship0 8 and give the client a
remedy for the lawyer's breach.
Corresponding duties, on the other hand, arise through the client. They
are derivative in the lawyer because the lawyer is acting for the client.'09 The
right to file suit on behalf of a client is the client's right. If the client has no
right of action, the lawyer has no greater right to file the suit simply because
of the relationship of attorney and client. Thus, when the lawyer interacts with
others on behalf of a client, the duties of candor and fairness imposed on the
lawyer in those dealings are really duties imposed on the client, because it is
the client who is actually dealing with the others through the lawyer."10
101. Id. comment.
102. For persons committed to psychiatric hospitals, problems associated with
release from the institution present the greatest concerns. See Brakel, Legal Problems
of People in Mental Hospitals: An Exploratory Study, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. R.J. 567,
578-85.
103. See Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in the Mental Health Field, 1977 Am.
BAR FOUND. R.J. 467, 469-71.
104. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
105. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.1.
106. See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY
L.J. 909, 961-62 (1980). Professor Patterson was a consultant to the Model Rules.
107. Id. at 963.
108. See id. at 965.
109. See id. at 963.
110. See id. at 962.
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Confidentiality is a corresponding duty. The lawyer has no greater obliga-
tion to maintain the confidences or secrets of a client than does the client to
maintain those same confidences and secrets."' 1 Thus, if information can be
obtained from a client in discovery, or through subpoena, it can also be ob-
tained from the lawyer by the same process." 2 Confidentiality is like other
corresponding rights of the client, such as the right to file a lawsuit, because it
depends on the legal rights and obligations of the client."13 If the client vio-
lates his own legal obligations, confidentiality, being corresponding, will not
permit the lawyer to protect that violation. This appears to be the thrust of
many of the Model Rules, most notably Rule 1.6(b). In all of the exceptions to
confidentiality, the client will have violated a legal obligation. As a result, the
violation cannot be hidden by the lawyer, because he has no greater rights
than the client.
The client violates no legal obligation when he makes an imprudent deci-
sion which has an adverse effect on his property; thus, the duty of confidential-
ity remains. The law presumes that all persons are competent absent a decla-
ration of incompetency. Therefore, the lawyer who reveals confidences
regarding poor decisions of a disabled client violates the duty of confidentiality
because there is no corresponding obligation on the client to do the same. This
situation creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer. If the lawyer can no
longer fulfill the correlative duties, even after communication and counseling
with the client,"14 the lawyer should withdraw2 5 rather than reveal.
To require revelation in this context goes well beyond the spirit of the
Rules. As expressed by Chairman Kutak, the Model Rules relating to confi-
dentiality are not intended to make the lawyer a policeman." 06 If a non-com-
mitted disabled client makes imprudent decisions regarding his own property,
there is probably a family in the background. The lawyer cannot serve as both
representative and conscience. A failure to act by those who should be con-
cerned with the client's welfare will not be resolved by the nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship."17
111. See id. at 963.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 962.
114. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.4, 2.1
(ABA Adopted Version 1983).
115. See id. Rule 1.16.
116. See Kutak, A Commitment to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A. J. 804, 805
(1982).
117. The comment to the adopted version notes that a lawyer sometimes becomes
a de facto guardian for an incapacitated client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.14 comment (ABA Adopted Version 1983). The legal background to an
earlier version clearly prevents the lawyer from becoming the actual guardian of the
client or from substituting the judgment of the lawyer for that of the client. Id. Rule
1.14 legal background (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The adoption of the final version
of Rule 1.6 does, however, create a problem. If the client owns property with another,
as in a community property jurisdiction, then it would be possible for the client to
attempt to dispose of that property in contravention of the co-owner's rights. In addi-
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As the foregoing examples demonstrate, there is no detriment from the
repealing of Rule 1.14(b). Elimination of the Rule, however, should not end
the matter. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Model Code is its failure to
consider that the entire legal basis of the attorney-client relationship may be
flawed by the existence of a disability preventing the effective creation of an
agency"u 8 All of the rules, including Rule 1.14(a), presume that the relation-
ship is entered into by consenting competent persons, and therefore the client
has some decision-making ability, at least over the subject matter of the repre-
sentation. Throughout the preceding sections, it has been assumed that Rule
1.14(b) also relates to an absence of ability by the client to make subject mat-
ter decisions and thereby address the evils which result if the lawyer follows
the dictates of the rule in that situation. This follows from a literal reading of
both the rules and the comments. If, however, a construction of Rule 1.14(b)
applies that rule only to an impairment of the client in the ability to enter the
transactional relationship of attorney and client or to exercise judgment with
regard to that relationship, then the rule may have a basis. Such a construc-
tion would require a rule drafted to make the distinction clear.
VI. A SUBSTITUTE
It is entirely possible that a person is incapable of being a client--of liv-
ing up to the obligations of what has been seen as a mutual agency, with both
lawyer and client each serving as both principal and agent. 119 Though not nec-
essarily specifically addressing these client obligations, the rules implicitly pre-
sume that there are qualifications to undertaking the role of client. While rules
such as Model Rule 1.14(a) make it clear that those qualifications are ex-
tremely limited, they must still be present. Thus, a disabled client may reach
the point where a relationship is no longer possible. When this occurs, the
contract of attorney and client must cease, because one of the parties, the
client, is no longer capable of performing the obligations necessary to continue
this legal relationship. "[T]he after-occurring insanity of the principal, or his
tion to creating title problems, such actions by the client could constitute a fraud upon
the property rights of the co-owner. Under earlier versions of the Model Rules, a law-
yer could have revealed the intent by the client to injure the property rights of another.
See id. Rule 1.7(c)(2) (Discussion Draft 1980) (permitting revelation when necessary
to prevent client from committing a deliberately wrongful act); id. Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981) (permitting revelation when the lawyer believes the act of the
client will be a fraud on the property of another); id. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Revised Final
Draft 1982) (permitting revelation when the lawyer reasonably believes the client's act
will perpetrate a fraud on the property interests of another). Reports of the final debate
on Rule 1.6 do not indicate any concern for this problem. See Midyear Meeting of
American Bar Association, 51 U.S.L.W. 2488, 2488-89 (Feb. 22, 1983). Under the
current disciplinary rules, DR 7-102(B)(1) would require revelation in such a circum-
stance, at least in those jurisdictions which did not adopt the 1974 Amendment to that
rule. Compare note 47 supra.
118. See Patterson, supra note 106, at 968-69.
119. See id. at 926-29.
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inability to exercise any volition upon the subject by reason of an entire loss of
mental power, operates as a revocation or suspension for the time being, of the
authority of an agent ... .
When such a situation arises, the attorney may have some duty to reveal.
Upon suspension of the agency, the attorney loses all power to act for the
client. If the attorney continues to act knowing that there is no authority, the
attorney should probably be held personally liable for the actions. 121 Thus,
revelation could be permitted to the extent reasonably necessary to "establish
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client, or to establish a defense to a . . .civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the cli-
ent.' 1 22 The revelation required, however, would not be of the client's condi-
tion so as to have a representative appointed. Rather, it would be the type
required under Rule 4.1 .12 If a lawyer has been acting for a client in a partic-
ular transaction and the client has become so incapacitated as to render the
agency relationship suspended, failure to disclose this fact to the third party
would amount to a "material misrepresentation" within the meaning of Rule
4.1(b)(1).
What is needed, therefore, is a new Rule 1.14(b), which embodies this
concept and provides an outer limit on the advocacy required under Rule
1.14(a). The following is a suggestion:
When, after undertaking representation of a client it becomes reasonably
clear to the lawyer that the client is suffering from a disability and is thereby
no longer capable of aiding the lawyer in furthering the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the lawyer may make such disclosure of this fact to third parties as
is reasonably necessary to comply with the provisions of Rule 4.1, except that
no such disclosure is authorized where the lawyer is employed for the limited
purpose of representing the client in any matter wherein the disability of the
client is the subject matter of the representation.
Under this substitute, the lawyer would be permitted to advise others that
the authority to act for the client is absent, thereby preventing the lawyer
from being personally liable and preventing a material misrepresentation of
fact to the third party with whom the lawyer has dealt on behalf of the client.
The rule is limited to a disability arising after the relationship of attorney and
120. F. MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY § 253, at 166-67 (1889).
121. See id. § 543.
122. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (ABA
Adopted Version 1983).
123. See id. Rule 4.1:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is neces-
sary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client unless disclos-
ure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
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client is already established. If the disability existed before the creation of the
relationship, agency law would prevent the client as principal from retaining
the lawyer as agent.12 4 The rule is also limited to prevent disclosure in cases,
such as incompetency and other proceedings, where the lawyer is either ap-
pointed or retained to contest the issue of the client's disability. Such represen-
tation is limited in scope. Because such representation is often constitutionally
required to satisfy the due process rights of the client, the lawyer is, in es-
sence, undertaking the role of public agent-a person employed "to do some
act for [an individual] in an official capacity, under a special and particular
obligation to him as an individual.' 25 The general agency rule when dealing
with public agents is that when such agency is known by the other party, as it
would be in a case in which an attorney represents a client whose mental sta-
tus is questioned, the warranty of authority of the agent will not encompass
personal liability in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. Thus, there is
no need to disclose, either to protect the attorney under Rule 1.6, or to prevent
a material misrepresentation under Rule 4.1.
VII. CONCLUSION
Proposed Model Rule 1.14(a) makes a valiant attempt to resolve the best
interests/advocacy dichotomy by adopting a philosophy which sees the lawyer
as an advocate of the disabled client. Consequently, the lawyer's obligation
toward the disabled client is no different than the obligation to any other cli-
ent. Having made the policy decision that a normal attorney-client relationship
should exist, it is error to permit, as does Rule 1.14(b), disclosure of informa-
tion learned during the course of the representation. Such disclosure violates
the spirit as well as the letter of the rules dealing with confidences and con-
flicts-of-interest. While injury and danger can and should be revealed in any
attorney-client relationship, provisions already exist outside Rule 1.14(b)
which permit such disclosure. In other circumstances, actions by the lawyer
far short of revelation may be indicated.
Rule 1.14(a) cannot exist alone. The basis of the relationship of attorney
and client, being one primarily of agency, presupposes an ability on the part of
the client to continue its existence. When that ability terminates, so does the
relationship. The duties of the lawyer, as agent, as officer of the court, and as
citizen, require revelation to those with whom the lawyer has dealt of the ab-
sence of authority to continue to act for the client.
A rule constructed with these factors in mind aids the lawyer in fulfilling
the obligations imposed by our courts in the representation of the disabled. It
permits advocacy, yet prevents a legal relationship of attorney and client from
existing under impermissible conditions. As a result, the rule would fulfill the
ideals of the drafters in making the new draft the restatement that it was
124. See F. MECHEN, supra note 120, § 47.
125. Id. § 547.
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intended to be. It will effectively "make distinctions based on the nature of the
client, the role of the lawyer, and the legal process involved."12
126. Patterson, supra note 106, at 969.
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